For the first time in modern history, free trade co-exists with free finance. Free trade and free finance are not mutually reinforcing, but cause a mismatch between the demand and supply of risk capital. This mismatch potentially hurts small firms and local interests most. What can they do about it? It depends on state institutions: the more centralized the state, the fewer opportunities available to potential losers to curb free finance. As a result, financial globalization is most successful in centralized countries, where resistance to centralization is least strongly felt. This hypothesis is systematically tested on a sample of OECD countries.
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The present study makes three related claims. First, free trade and free finance cause a mismatch between the demand and supply of risk capital. Second, this mismatch hurts small firms and local interests most. Third, financial globalization is least successful in decentralized countries, where resistance to centralization is most strongly felt. The study systematically tests the third claim against a universe of OECD countries.
A first section argues that free trade causes firms to demand more risk capital. A second section argues that current trends in finance make suppliers of investment capital more risk averse. A third section maps the potential winners and losers, and a fourth, the losers' nonmarket options. A penultimate section derives and tests the hypothesis that financial globalization is correlated with state centralization. A concluding section recalls, and expands on the findings, contrasting the present period with the Gold Standard.
Free Trade and the Rising Demand for Risk Capital
Free trade increases competition among firms, cutting into their profit margins and forcing them to devise new profit-making strategies. Cost-cutting through subcontracting, relocation, flexible wages and working-hours can only offer temporary relief to a handful of pacesetters, before teeing off a new--and stiffer--round of cut-throat competition. A more sustainable strategy is product differentiation. Product differentiation is an attempt to carve a niche in a given product market, which the firm then tries to corner and exploit to restore its profit margin. Ways of doing so range from cosmetic repackaging to actual innovation, with the latter being more effective. But even innovation only allows the successful firm to achieve no more than a temporary monopoly, lasting the time it takes for competitors either to emulate the successful firm or to outperform it with a more advanced product. The emulated firm's best response is to differentiate further and relaunch the process of innovation for another and probably several more rounds. The profitable firms are those that are flexible enough to produce a large and continuously changing panoply of products that markets want, in large quantity, at low cost, within (and for) a short amount of time.
Product differentiation is to be contrasted with the oligopolistic and protectionist methods that obtained under the gold standard. Although triggered by the sudden loss by Continental Europe of its comparative advantage in landintensive products, the protectionist reaction of the 1880s corresponded with the second industrial revolution (electricity, the combustion engine, the Bessemer furnace, the Solvay process, and so on).
7 The high internal scale economies which characterized production in these sectors, along with the tariff protection of national markets, made possible the development of large firms that were able to exercise control over their markets. It was standard practice in these new sectors to use the superprofits raised in the captive national market to cross-subsidize market expansion abroad. 8 Along with these vertically-integrated multinational firms, coexisted smaller firms, producing for a protected national market.
The dismantling of protection in the postwar era relegated these two traditional forms of management to the shelf of history. The firms producing for the national market were the first and obvious casualty. The vertically-integrated firms came next. 9 Organized around the production of "long runs" of a handful of products, mass-production firms proved unable to retool cheaply and timely. New forms of organization emerged to match the new requisite of flexible differentiation. One of them, the industrial district, is a network of small, low-capitalized, and versatile enterprises, working together to spread risk, offer a greater diversity of products, and maintain a skilled workforce. 10 Firms in industrial districts rely on local municipalities, guilds, and trade associations to supply them with the necessary externalities--vocational training, price and wage regulation, marketing facilities, quality normalization, and, more importantly to the present study, access to capital. The other "fittest" is the so-called "network firm." It is the dis-integrated version of the old large company, composed of the equivalent of a lean holding company dealing with its subsidiaries as if they were independent subcontractors.
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The shift toward networking, which is common to small and large firms alike, reflects the fact that market differentiation through product innovation is both costly and risky. R&D costs have a steep fixed component, while returns on R&D are both probabilistic and afflicted with externalities--they diffuse rapidly.
12 Fixed cost, probabilistic returns, and externalities are three good reasons for firms to diversify the portfolio of products containing the same technological know-how. Rather than building larger research departments, firms are more inclined to spread risk with other firms and local governments. 13 Networked or not, however, today's firms, unlike their ancestors, have a continuous need for risk capital. Moreover, whereas firms in the past could establish market power by sinking capital into physical assets which could be used as partial collateral, today's corporate strategy hinges on investment in so-called "knowledge- Piore and Sabel 1984. 10 See Bagnasco 1977; Herrigel 1996. 11 See Aoki 1988 , Sabel 1989 , and Cooke and Morgan 1994 based" assets, void of market value and unusable as collateral. Finally, whereas yesterday's firms could raise most of their risk capital on their own through monopolistic pricing, today's firms are in a much greater need of an external source of risk capital, on which they can rely if, for whatever reason, their capacity to extract rents momentarily fails to deliver the sums that are needed to stay in the race for new products.
In sum, there is an increasing demand for risk-taking capital. This increasing demand, however, is not matched by an increasing supply.
Free Finance and the Declining Supply of Risk Capital
Despite a formidable surge in volume, the supply of capital is increasingly risk averse. Risk aversion, I argue, is the direct consequence of the two long-term trends that are characteristic, although unevenly so across countries, of all financial markets: internationalization and securitization. A greater proportion of financing is done across borders today than in 1960, and a greater proportion is done through securities markets than through bank lending and borrowing (securitization is also referred to in the specialized literature as ÒdisintermediationÓ). The presentation is organized around two points: the causes of internationalization and securitization, and their consequences for the supply of capital.
The causes of internationalization and securitization. A multiplicity of eventsÑincluding the failings of the Bretton Woods system, the demise of Keynesian monetary policy, fiscal retrenchment, privatization, deregulation, the debt crisis, the ageing of the populationÑhave been alluded to account for the new trends. Yet, a common thread appears to link all these events together; each was used by the commercial banks as an opportunity to loosen the regulatory corset in which they found themselves constrained following the banking crises of the 1930s. The story of this emancipation falls into two distinct periods: the 1960s and the present period, which, for all practical purposes, began with the oil shocks.
Banking regulation was adopted in the wake of the global banking crisis of 1931. Drawing the lesson that universal (multipurpose) banks had fared worse than specialized ones, governments tried to tear banks away from the securities business through artificial requirements of liquidity rules, reserve requirements, and the separation of deposit from investment banking. The large commercial banks were cut down to size and their future expansion was contained.
From 1930 until 1960, the center banks kept losing market share to their rivals: (1) the private nonprofit banks, including the savings banks, credit cooperatives, and mortgage companies; (2) the state sector, including the postal savings system and the state-run credit banks 14 ; (3) and, in the U.S. and Swiss 14 State banking is the direct intervention of the state in the allocation of credit. It is not to be confused with bank nationalization: nationalization aims at redistributing bank profits, whereas state banking aims at reallocating bank credit. State banks, which may be owned or not by the state, are usually financed by bonds. State banks enjoy state borrowing privileges, unlike nationalized banks, which must procure their equity on the market like any other firm. State banks are usually specialized (one lends to local governments, another to farmers, still another to home owners or small firms, or to firms in need of venture capital, etc.).
federal systems, the local commercial banks--the State-regulated State banks in the U.S. and the Kanton-owned Kantonal banks in Switzerland. Created to avoid another crisis of illiquidity, the liquidity ratios were, after the war, diverted from their initial goal and used, instead, to contain inflation. Being spared from these restrictions in all countries but Germany, the nonprofit and state banks expanded their market share at the expense of commercial banks.
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The commercial banks sought ways to escape or reverse this damaging trend. The development of the "Euromarkets" in the 1960s provided them with the first major opportunity to escape restrictive domestic regulations. British and American bankers at first created the Euromarkets as a way of circumventing exchange controls on the sterling and the dollar. 16 Supportive of their respective bankers, British and U.S. regulatory agencies refrained from extending domestic regulations to offshore lending. The Euromarkets developed free of bank reserve requirements and interest rate regulation, and were used by large banks throughout the world as a means to evade the vicious squeeze to which they were subject at home by governments intent on keeping interest rates artificially low to promote home investment while using bank reserve requirements to contain inflation.
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Simultaneously, banks successfully lobbied for the loosening of the interwar regulatory straitjacket. They had the support of their regulators, who grew disturbed at the negative impact of the commercial banks' decline on the efficiency of monetary policy, of which the banks served as conduit. Starting in the 1960s, a process of socalled "deregulation" took place, eventually leading to the total or near abolition of the difference between commercial banks, savings banks, credit cooperatives, mortgage banks, and so forth, the repeal of territorial curbs on major bank branch expansion, and the extension of the central bank's regulatory competence to all financial institutions. Unsurprisingly, the deregulation of deposit rates and the dismantling and/or generalization of reserve requirements to all financial sectors reversed the secular decline in the market shares of the commercial banks. Owing their growth to the regulations imposed on banks, non-commercial banks responded to the new competition from banks either by taking greater risks, such was the case with the U.S. S&L's and the British building societies, or simply by turning themselves into regular banks, as in Australia. 18 Renouncing their borrowing privileges, state banks lost ground to commercial banks most dramatically in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway.
19 Germany was least affected, because it had fewer barriers between different types of institutions. Graph 1 shows the evolution of the relative market shares of the profit, nonprofit, state, and local banking sectors. The reconquest of the market by the profit banks beginning in the sixties is most apparent in Australia, Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands, 15 For a good account of the United States, Britain, and Germany, see Kregel 1997:305 . 16 Kelly 1976. 17 See Helleiner 1994: 88, 93 New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. It is absent in Austria, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United States. The logic behind this variation will become clear as the argument unfolds.
[ Graph 1 ] The oil shocks reinforced the previous trend toward internationalization. The crisis created a sudden, though temporary, gap between capital-rich, oil-exporting countries and capital-scarce, oil-importing countries, causing capital to flow massively from the former to the latter via the Euromarkets. The oil shocks also triggered a succession of events and policy reforms which indirectly gave a boost to securitization. The neo-liberal revolution led to a reduction in taxes, forcing state treasuries to finance their growing debt on the bond market. Accordingly, treasuries sought to ease the refinancing of the debt by pursuing deflationary policies, thereby reviving the moribund bond market for corporate borrowers at the expense of bank lending. 20 In Japan, the government initially tried to avoid the onerous bond market by pressing the banks to buy Japanese treasury bonds at below-market rates, with the even more direct effect of crowding out loans to the private sector. 21 The privatization of state-owned companies in European countries also led governments to promote stock markets, passing legislation making the purchase of securities more attractive to households.
The growing privatization of pensions plans in some OECD countries, associated with a deep-seated ageing of populations, is responsible for the growing assets of insurance companies and pension funds. 22 Overall, households are more willing today than in the past to hold a larger share of their financial wealth in the form of stock exchange securities, both as investment and insurance for their retirement age.
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The debt crisis reinforced the trend toward securitization in several ways. In the short term, the crisis left many a large bank with downgraded credit ratings. Forced to pay higher borrowing rates on the Eurocurrency markets, the banks were progressively priced out of the market for corporate external capital; the banks' corporate clients found it less costly either to self-finance their investments or resort to the bond market. Further, not long after the banks had managed to overcome these momentary tribulations, their governments collectively agreed to establish and enforce stricter capital-to-assets ratios, with the twofold effect of constraining lending until banks could meet the new ratio and making bank loans dearer ever after.
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Faced with disintermediationÑthat is, the replacement of loans and deposits by securitiesÑcommercial banks (along with savings banks) lobbied for a piece of the securities business. Securities markets, following the crashes of 1929, were tighly 20 To the extent that certain countries developed budget deficits larger than others, this also led to crossborder flows. The case in point is the US budget deficit of the 1980s, which triggered a flight of Japanese capital to the US. 21 See Khoury 1990: 106. 22 See Green 1997 and Davis 1995. 23 For data on households' financial holdings covering seven OECD countries for the period , see Rybczynski 1994 On this see Kapstein 1994. regulated; brokerage commissions were fixed and membership was tightly controlled. Moreover, in countries such as Italy, Belgium, France, the United States, and Sweden, commercial banks were explicitly banned from dealing in securities. The trend toward securitization vastly increased the monopoly rents captured by securities houses, at the banksÕ expense. The large commercial banks successfully pressed for deregulation. The separation between commercial banks and securities houses was abolished in European countries. Although still on paper in the United States, the Glass-Steagall prohibition was partially emptied from its content by the FED during the 1980s. 25 With the help of institutional investors (insurances, investment funds, and pension funds), which, as big clients, had an obvious interest in the liberalization of brokerage commissions, banks also lobbied for the deregulation of rates and membership. Following the leadership of New York in 1975, the stock markets of ZŸrich, London, Tokyo, Toronto, Sydney, and Amsterdam were deregulated in the 1980s, and those of Paris, Milan, and Frankfurt, to just cite the most important, in the 1990s. 26 In all cases, entry was also extended to foreigners. The last and final phase in the deregulation of financial markets, one that is happening presently, is the opening of the insurance market to banks. In a majority of OECD countries, financial institutions already enjoy the right to sell the mix of financial products they want.
In sum, internationalization and securitization have their roots in the commercial banks' unhappiness with the interwar regulatory system. The fragmentation of financial markets into watertight compartments, along with the establishment, in a majority of countries, of state banks and comprehensive public insurance schemes, were unsustainable because they were biased against the most resourceful players in the game. A conjunction of lobbying muscle and favorable circumstances allowed the commercial banks, some seventy years later, to reset the regulatory clock to 1928 and, in many countries, to reconquer their lost market shares. Yet, in the process of doing so, the banks have opened a PandoraÕs boxÑ they have unleashed competition in the field of finance.
Consequences of internationalization and securitization.
Internationalization and securitization have two negative consequences for banks: (1) they raise the level of competition, reducing profit margins; (2) they increase bankÕs vulnerability to market volatility. Banks have responded to this dual threat by embracing a strategy of product standardization and amalgamation. This move, though quite functional for the banks, has negative consequences for investors and borrowers at large, as it reduces the amount of investment information available to all market participants and increases investorsÕ risk aversion. I develop each point successively.
Competition eliminates rents, putting a downward pressure on bank profit.
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Banks cannot as easily resort to product diversification as firms to restore, even temporarily, their profit margins. There are few R&D rents in banking. As Tony Porter (1993: 93) writes, "new products mature and bank hierarchies are being replaced with arm's length transactions in these instruments... A wholesale market in swaps has developed, promoted by investment banks, and was so successful that everyone joined in." Only the high end of investment banking is escaping the commodification that has followed the commercial banksÕ entry in securities marketsÑthe highly personalized businesses, such as very large stock and bond flotations, private placements, cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions, and designerdriven derivative products, to name a few. This is the reason why the largest commercial banks are acquiring well-known investment banks. 28 Besides the fact that it gives them easy access to large international issues, this is where the personalized and lucrative deals still are. There is limited room at the top, however.
A second source of concern is real interest rate volatility. With households seeking the higher returns of securities markets, banks are no longer able to finance their activity through deposits alone, but must also borrow on the international money market. So doing, they are subject to interest rate volatility, which, contrary to monetaristsÕ predictions, has increased since markets have been allowed to set interest rates. They also have to worry about their credit rating, which determines the price they pay. Banks, therefore, have a growing preference for assets that are easily disposable, not only to be able to unload them in case of interest hike, but also because disposable assets have a market value that is directlyÑand more favorablyÑassessable by MoodyÕs and Standard & PoorÕs.
Banks have responded to losses and volatility by pursing a strategy of product (asset) standardization. Asset standardization makes bank assets less risky and more valuable, for more easily disposable. This explains the recent success of Òasset-backed securities,Ó by which banks ÒsecuritizeÓ some of their loans. Banks typically collect a large portfolio of bank loans that are then used as collateral for new bonds (hence the name Òasset-backed securityÓ). It works because markets can price certain bank loans betterÑand thus higherÑthan single banks, provided, first, that these loans occur in large pools for which past experience can be used to predict default rates and, second, that claims over collaterals be easily transferable. Only a few categories of bank assets do so far meet these requirementsÑcredit card receivables, corporate receivables, automobile loans, mortgages, leases, and home equity loans.
Standardization decreases information requirements, thus making massproductionÑthe processing of a high volume of instruments at paper-thin profit marginsÑa viable strategy. Banks typically increase volume by expanding their existing distribution networks, mostly through acquisition, due to the large fixed costs sunk into branch networks. Bank amalgamation increases the deposit and retailing base of the bank, improving its placement facilities and enabling it to play a role in the largest and most profitable issues, international especially. There are indeed substantial scale economies in investment banking, the cost of a large issue being no significantly higher than that of a small issue.
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Although quite functional from a bankerÕs perspective, bank concentration and asset standardization have negative implications for market efficiency. It is necessary to recall a few themes from information economics. Banks and markets supply borrowers with external capital differently. On the one hand, markets are unable to gather and transmit information when one side of the contract has an interest in hiding information, as it is the case with borrowers. Banks, instead, have access to private information, not only because they have a vested interest in closely monitoring the institutions to which they grant credit, but also because their relations with borrowers are long-term and impregnated with reputation and personal trust.
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As a result, the market will ask for a higher risk premium than the banker. On the other hand, markets are more efficient at pricing products for which there exists sufficient information or guarantees, provided that these products occur in high volume. In sum, securities and loans are specialized instruments; securities are good for financing the known and numerous whereas loans are better adapted to the less visible and more specific.
This relative advantage that banks have over markets in overcoming information asymmetry is precisely what is being presently sacrificed to the double strategy of asset standardization and bank concentration. As banks become more dependent on securities markets, both to procure resources and dispose of assets, they have an incentive to neglect loans that are information-specific, illiquid, and that should invariably drag their credit ratings down. Banks also have an interest in pursuing differentiated asset-management policies, eliminating the crosssubsidization that traditionally existed between large and small loans. Finally, the trend toward bank concentration makes monitoring through physical presence at board meetings impractical for the small and medium-size firms, for bankers are able to attend only so many board meetings in a year, preferably those of the largest companies.
The banksÕ lesser capacity to reduce information asymmetry is not compensated by a greater availability of markets to do so. Improvements in information technology facilitate the dissemination of public information; more information is available on borrowers for whom there is information to begin with. But they do little for the gathering of private, transaction-specific information. There is no one else, besides bankers, to assume the role of "delegated monitor." Institutional investors typically hold highly diversified portfolios with small stakes in hundreds of companies for short periods and are thus unlikely to assume that role.
31 Credit-rating institutions such as Moody's and Standard and Poor's are not designed to gather transaction-specific information.
The disengagement of the state from the economy along with its replacement by institutional investors and private banks in the areas of pension and investment means that today's investors are more risk averse than in the past. The state was a 29 Smith 1992, p. 137. 30 See Diamond 1984 . 31 Porter 1992, p. 69. There are exceptions, involving U.S. public-employee funds; see Davis 1995, p. 192. very risk-prone investor (wit the French herd of white elephants), covering for its losses through tax revenues. Institutional investors, in contrast, are serving a population of risk-averse individuals seeking a higher return on their life savings. It is true that markets have devised new instruments called "derivatives" to deal with risk (options, futures, warrants, to name a few), by which any large investor can insure its portfolio against undesirable change. The time horizon of these markets, however, is short-termÑbetween one and two years maximumÑand no match for good old government fiscal inertia.
I have shown that the surge in competition has made the financial sector less able to supply risk capital to the non financial sector. We now turn to the redistributional effects of this evolution.
Potential Winners and Losers I have so far described a global trend, paying no attention to cross-national variations and probably exaggerating the extent to which Anglo-Saxon finance has spread beyond its shores. It is time to backtrack a little and reverse the initial question: Why are some countries, Germany for instance, resisting globalization? The answer, I argue, is that globalization is causing potential losers to lobby against it, but not all potential losers enjoy the political power to mount a successful blocking campaign. I will establish a map of potential losers and winners in this section and then address the power issue in the next section. I consider the financial, non-financial, and government sectors successively.
Within the world of finance, the uncontested winners are the commercial banks. Surely competition is increasing for them as for everyone else, but so are the stakes of competition; new fields of activity are being opened up in all venues of finance, allowing the commercial banks to restore their prior market shares. Institutional investors, notably investment and mutual funds, are other obvious winners. In contrast, nonprofit banks, state banks, local banks, and securities houses are the losers. This line of cleavage is bisected by another, pitting large against small financial firms. The dismantling of the self-regulatory regime administered by the corporation of dealers and brokers in postwar stock exchanges broke up the past solidarity that existed between small and large securities houses. More generally, a surge in competition in a growing field that is marked with scale economies is bound to favor size. Small commercial banks may end up absorbed by larger ones, whereas large securities houses and investment banks of high repute are likely to diversify in traditional banking.
In the case of non-financial corporations, the potential winners are the large firms, whereas the losers are the small and medium-size companies. The latter are firms that are too large to expand on the sole basis of internal funding, yet too small to enable investors to evaluate their earning potential with a modicum of confidence; they must rely instead on bank loans. Banks, however, are moving away from smallbusiness loans, because such loans cannot be securitized. If small firms are threatened, so are small-firm districts. Deregulation and unrestrained competition are harmful to industrial districts. Jonathan Zeitlin (1992, p. 290) argues that industrial districts depend on public goods (vocational training, price and wage regulation, marketing facilities, quality normalization, and access to capital) which are not provided by market mechanisms. In his study of Britain, Zeitlin (1995, p. 105) points to the disappearance of regional banking as a cause for the disappearance of small firms and industrial districts.
With governments, two lines of cleavage are apparentÑcenter v. local, and local v. local. Central government institutions gain from financial internationalization in several ways. First, the growth of the domestic and international bond markets provides treasuries with the possibility of refinancing the public debt at optimal conditions, nowadays that central banks are independent and monetary policy is no longer used to maintain artificially low interest rates. Second, deregulation has freed the regulatory agencies of the central government from past capture by members; deregulation has also repealed self-regulation by professional associations and local agencies. 33 In the field of banking, de-segmentation allowed the banks' regulator, the central bank (the FED in the United States), to extend its regulatory authority to the entire banking sector. Monetary policy gained in efficiency, although theses gains were canceled out by the greater difficulty that all central banks now face in restraining the money market. 34 Last, globalization is creating a new cleavage, pitting local governments against one another. There is an emerging consensus across disciplines that modern production has a territorial, local dimension. Michael Porter (1990, p. 158) writes that "more open global competition makes the home base more, not less, important." Paul Krugman (1991) shows, in contrast to the prevailing assumption that the decline in transportation costs makes firms indifferent to localization, that it makes them want to agglomerate. It is a fact that multinational firms locate their most advanced technological capacities in their home countries. 35 Students of flexible specialization stress the importance of geographical concentration in attracting talented people and the role of proximity in the production of learning and innovation. 36 As Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift (1992, p. 576) put it well, Òthe world economy may have become decentralized, but it is not necessarily becoming decentered.Ó In sum, firmsÕ greater reliance on R&D, which is a consequence of freer trade, creates economies of agglomeration.
Economies of agglomeration potentially have severe redistributional consequences for local governments. Those with an already dense industrial base may see it further reinforced, while those with a weak one risk to lose what they have, and those without any might remain barren. The most favored areas are those located around large metropolitan regions. Big cities, according to Tšdtling (1994, p. 74) , Òstill have superior locational conditions such as good transportation and 33 See Moran 1994 , and also LŸtz 1996 , and Cerny 1989 On the benefits of deregulation accruing to central banks, see Ackland and Harper 1992;  communications networks, high levels of education, large number of research institutions, and highly qualified labor.Ó Less favored are the industrial districts located at the periphery. Table 1 recapitulates the potential distortions associated with the mounting competition in financial and product markets. Among financial firms, the expected winners are the profit, center banks, institutional investors, and the large securities houses and investment banks. The expected losers are all the others, especially the savings banks, cooperatives, and small securities houses. Among non-financial firms, the potential winners are the large firms and the industrial districts located within large metropolitan areas; the potential losers are the small firms in general, and peripheral small-firm districts in particular. Among government agencies, central government treasuries and regulatory agencies are expected to win, local governments and professional organizations to lose. Moreover, municipalities governing large metropolitan areas are likely to gain at the expense of municipalities located at the periphery.
[ Table 1 ]
The Potential Losers' Nonmarket Options Potential losers have a choice: they may defer to market forces and take a loss; alternatively, they may decide to challenge the verdict of the market in the political realm and seek protection from the state. What they choose depends on the relative expected costs and benefits of each option. Although lack of information makes it impossible to actually quantify these options, it is possible to assess the relative difficulty that potential market losers face in getting access to policymaking.
Political parties do not figure among the political channels available to potential losers. With perhaps the exception of the United States, all party systems in OECD countries were formed during the interwar and immediate postwar periods at the peak of the class struggle. Today, these party systems are still cleft by the class cleavageÑthe moderate right is less dependent on unionized labor support than the moderate left. Albeit dominant in the labor market, the class cleavage, however, is absent from the capital marketÑworkers that are either skilled or employed by large firms and residing in urban areas count among the winners of free trade and free finance, whereas those withoug skills or employed in small firms or in peripheral areas are among the losers. In general, claims that financial internationalization makes labor worse off relative to capital have little, if any, empirical foundation. The Left is as much supportive of financial globalization as the Right.
37 This does not mean that the Left-Right conflict is absent from the globalization debate altogether, only that its focus has shifted from the issue of resistance to that of indemnification.The Left nay be better able to indemnify the losers of financial globalization than the Right, but equally willing to let them lose in the first place.
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37 See Garrett 1998 , Quinn 1997 , and Rodrik 1997 Not only are the two issues (resistance and indemnification) different, but they are not as closely linked as standard cost-benefit economics would expect them to be, given the constitutional incapacity of government (including the Left, since it cannot guarantee its re-election) to credibly commit to schemes of full indemnification for the victims of a policy otherwise deemed as more efficient for society as a whole.
Party systems are nonetheless registering an increasing resistance to globalization in the form of populist movementsÑthe French Front National, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Belgian Vlaams Blok, the Norwegian Progress Party, and the Australian One Nation Party, to name a few. 39 However, the extremist position of these parties and their focus on immigrant labor make them unattractive to small firms and small districts.
Like political parties, national trade associations are equally unlikely to articulate the small firmsÕ and small districtsÕ concerns. In all countries, industrial sectors first organized national associations in the second half of the 19 th century around the tariff issue. 40 As tariffs have declined and states reduced subsidiesÑtwo clear sectoral issue around which all members of the sector could rallyÑand the agenda has shifted to standards, taxation, and so forth, sectoral solidarity has declined, and, with it, the usefulness of the trade associations. In the credit sector, the decline of sectoral alignments is colinear with the decline of state banking. State banks were set up before and after World War II, with the main purpose of extending medium-and long-term credit to firms. State banks were usually specialized, one lending to farmers, another to sectors characterized by small firms, still another to home owners, and so forth. Their presence was strongest in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway. 41 They have since declined, due to the loss of their borrowing privileges, fiscal retrenchment, and the incipient conflict betwen large and small firms triggered by the internationalization and securitization of finance. More fundamentally, the national level of representation, be it parties or industry groups, cannot respond to the losersÕ demands for regulation because it cannot articulate a cleavage that is neither class-based nor sectoral, but is in fact territorial. The cleavage is territorial in part because of the spatial dimension of R&D and in part because that is the way financial markets are usually cleft. Capital having a preference for mobility, the determination of the geographic scope of that mobility, through controls or incentives, is the stake of financial politics.
As a result, the subnational government is an increasingly attractive level of organization and lobbying for the potential losers of financial internationalization. This trend is reinforced by the fact that budget constraints have forced central governments to compress the sums traditionally devoted to regional development policies, with local and regional communities left to bear the burden of change. Local communities are pressed to make themselves attractive to savers and firms, both local and external. Regions are increasingly locked into a race of which the winners may well be those that, in addition to their natural resources, have the most policy instruments at their disposal. 42 The upshot is an intensification of regionalism. Demands for devolution downward are aired from every corner of Europe, leading two of the most centralized governments (Britain and France) to engage on the road of institutional decentralization. Local power, however, is not something that a centralized government can easily improvise. Consider the following example. Throughout the eighties, the French elites became enamored with German financial decentralization; they were particularly impressed by the attention that large German banks lavished on small firms. In the last twenty years, the Berlin banks have gone out of their way to reenter, not without success, the market for small loans which, for more than a century, had been the exclusive hunting ground of the nonprofit banks. 43 In an attempt to replicate on French soil this worthwhile feature, the French state devolved authority for economic development to local and regional governments, notably the power to guarantee bank loans to local firms. Although the French banks responded positively to the financial incentive, the declared goal of the policyÑto bring center banks and local firms closer together and dot the French countryside with German-like industrial districtsÑis beyond reach. 44 Large banks lack the local knowledge needed to correctly price loans and have no incentive to acquire it because of the conviction that Paris cannot credibly commit to let a mismanaged local government go bust. Also, the French market for small loans is volatile and open to competition, making it impossible for banks to develop a self-sustaining relationship with small firms.
The small loan market is more successful in Germany because it is steady and lucrative, the result of a century of nursing and protection of each local economy against the competition of large German firms, large German banks, and foreign competition. Indeed, the German domestic market is regarded by foreign bankers as "one of the most impregnable." 45 It surely is one of the most densely networked. Centuries of decentralization have turned German LŠnder into miniature Japanese networks, involving local firms, local banks, and local civil servants. Little of this horizontal solidarity is visible in France; two decades of regionalization do not easily reverse two centuries of centralization. In sum, potential losers have a chance of stalling the trends that are harmful to them only in countries with a history of activist local governments, that is, in decentralized states.
What are the policies that these local governments should pursue? Active local governments with a history of involvement in their local economy have everything to win from product globalization but everything to lose from financial globalization. Their best response is selective globalizationÑa policy that accepts globalization in product markets but resists it in financial markets. In response to free trade, local governments should try to promote export orientation. They can do so either through direct subsidies or through supply-side incentives, including the promotion of education and vocational training, the financial support of research in public universities, and the wooing of firms with strong R&D components.
In response to free finance, local governments that already enjoy a wellsupplied local financial market should try to check its erosion by resisting any change in the regulatory status quo: resist the dismantling of existing tax and regulatory privileges enjoyed by the nonprofit and local banks, resist the repeal of 43 obstacles to inter-regional and international branching, and resist competition among regional stock exchanges. A more pro-active stand involves chartering a local state bank.
There are finally a series of measures which, although beyond the jurisdiction of any single individual local government, are in the collective interest of these governments and may thus be pursued in U.S.-Senate like bodies, in which local government representatives enjoy legislative power. Among such measures are the redefinition of existing industrial subsidy programs from their prior general or sectoral focus into local or regional programsÑfinanced by the central budget but allocated by local governments. A more general, though no less efficient, way of resisting bank disintermediation is to defend the state-run social security system against the encroachments of private pension plans. Still other include the protection by law of company secrecy to the effect of maintaining banksÕ comparative advantage over markets as a source of finance, and the promotion of laws insuring close bank-firm relationsÑfor instance, by recognizing creditors a say in management.
In sum, production under global competition has a spatial dimension, from which small firms and banks can benefit provided that they reside in territories with a history of economic activism. Conversely, losers in centralized states are powerless and unlikely to offer a credible opposition to the deepening of the international market.
Hypotheses and Evidence
Financial internationalization is a function of institutional centralization. Countries in which local governments are powerful and active in the local economy offer greater resistance to financial openness (though not to free trade). In contrast, countries with centralized states are more responsive to change in external financial markets.
Moreover, the structure of the credit market is an important (though not exclusive) mediating variable. Political decentralization is responsible for the existence of a segmented credit marketÑthat is, a dense financial network of local, nonprofit, and state banksÑwhich, in turn, makes possible local resistance to the deindustrializing effect of free finance.
The argument involves three testable hypotheses respectively numbered 1, 2, and 3 according to the following schema (see Graph 2).
[ Graph 2] There is scattered evidence that decentralized countries are pursuing policies of selective globalization. First, there is strong evidence that local governments are becoming an important level of public intervention in the economy. In the 12 member states of the ex-European Communities, the relative percentage of aid to industry channeled through regional aid (as opposed to sectoral, R&D, exportpromotion, small business, and other types of aid) has risen from an average of 37 percent over the period [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] to 50 percent over the period 1990-1992. 46 In the particular case of Germany, the corresponding increase is from 55 to 72 percent. Although the data are not directly comparable, a similar trend is visible in the OECD dataset, with regional aid rising from 10 percent of total subsidies in 1986 to 31 percent in 1993. 47 Second, there is some evidence that decentralized countries are also those that are the least advanced on the path toward financial deregulation. In the United States, the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which has been on Congress agenda for nearly two decades, has been systematically vetoed by local politicians. Until 1992, German capital markets remained undeveloped, in part because the regional exchanges, which enjoyed the political power through LŠnder authority over stock exchange matters to block reform, were opposed to a deregulation that would exclusively favor the Frankfurt exchange (LŸtz 1996) . Last, there is partial evidence that decentralized countries are also the least involved in global finance. Following the 1992 deregulation, the most open Community markets are expected to be those of the U.K., Netherlands, Belgium, and FranceÑall four highly centralized countries; the least accessible are expected to be those of Italy, Germany, and SpainÑthree decentralized countries. 48 In the following, I try to go beyond the anecdotal and offer systematic evidence that state institutions shape international financial dependence.
The dependent variable (degree of financial globalization) is alternatively measured by international flows and bond activity. The first measure is gross inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) weighted by GDP. Inflows are preferable to outflows, for the central aim of deregulation is to make domestic assets attractive to foreign investors. Gross flows are preferable to net flows, which are insignificant in most OECD countries, because advanced industrialized countries import about as much capital than they export.
The use of capital flows to measure financial interdependence has been criticized on the ground that, in a world of perfect capital mobility, rates of return would be the same everywhere and capital would then not move at all. Other measures have been preferred, including legal measures (capital controls) and behavioral ones (the degree of correlation between domestic investment and consumption).
49 I prefer capital flows to these other measures for several reasons. First, data on flows are available and usable as such; they need not be reconstructed, a process which inevitably invites interpretation.
50 Second, the claim that perfect financial integration should yield zero flow is irrelevant to the present era, for there still are differences in rates of return across countries, causing capital to keep flowing unabated until all differentials disappear. Finally, capital would still be on the move in an hypothetical integrated financial world market. Were it not the case, one would 46 Not including Brussels transfers to farmers and poor regions; see Commission 1990 , and European Commission 1995 See OECD 1992 and 1996b . 48 Smith 1992, p. 154. 49 On this, see Epstein and Schor 1992 , Hallerberg and Clark 1997 , Obstfeld 1995 , and Quinn and Incl ‡n 1997 Measures based on legal instruments, in particular, offer no edge on informal barriers to capital flows, which financiers consider to be important in the cases of Japan and Germany. not observe capital flowing between New York and Chicago. In effect, capital moves across territory to take advantage, not just of short-term financial arbitrage, but also of medium and long-term profit opportunities. The more integrated two markets are, the more important is the latter rationale in motivating capital flows.
The use of FDI inflows is problematic for a different reason. It only measures direct, not portfolio, investment. I introduce a second measure of internationalizationÑthe proportion of corporate bonds issued abroad. 51 The numerator is the value of corporate bonds issued on the Euro-and foreign markets, whereas the denominator is the value of corporate bonds issued on all marketsÑ Euro, foreign, and domestic.
The intermediate variable (credit market centralization) is measured by the asset market share of the profit banking sector.
The independent variable (state centralization) is measured by a fiscal proxyÑthe share of the central government in the appropriation of all governmentsÕ revenues.
A required control variable is the Anglo-Saxon tradition. There is no doubt that the trends identified above have been historically most present in Anglo-Saxon countries. This is especially so with respect to securitization. Not controlling for this fact would simply make the findings spurious.
Another obvious control variable is export dependence, on the grounds that exporting a sizable proportion of its national product makes an economy a likely candidate for financial internationalization. Including export dependence as control variable should capture the variance caused by the natural synergy existing between financial and trade openness, thereby allowing the other variables (the centralization variable and the Anglo-Saxon dummy in particular) to capture the remaining varianceÑthe one that is being theorized about here. Additional control variables will be discussed in the context of each hypothesis.
Two types of test are performedÑcross-sectional and cross-sectional timeseries.
Cross sectional models. I first perform a series of cross-sectional OLS regressions at discrete points in time. These tests have a small N, ranging from 10 to 20 depending on the model. Small-N studies present the advantage of transparencyÑ it is easy to monitor the behavior of each case. The drawback is case sensitivityÑit takes but a few outliers to make or break a correlation. I compensate for this limitation by performing two sets of diagnostics. First, for each regression I calculate the DFITS statisticÑa measure of the degree to which each observation has a deviant residual or pulls the regression line toward itself. This allows me to identify potential outliers, some mild, some strong.
52 I then exclude these outliers from the regression and run the regression a second time. Because exclusion is a drastic solution, I try each time to find a substantive rationale for doing so. The 51 Data on equity are too sparse to be included. 52 I use standard definitions of strong and mild. A strong potential outlier is one with a DIFTS value superior to what is known as the Òhigh cutoff ÒpointÑthe square root of p, with p being the number of variables plus one (the constant). A mild potential outlier is one whose DFITS statistics is situated between this high cutoff and the so-called Òlow cutoffÓ pointÑ2*square root of p/n, with n the number of cases. See Bollen and Jackman 1990).
second test consists in the visual inspection of the partial regression plots.
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Although much more informative than DFITS, such plots are space-consuming and reserved for very-low-N situations.
Hypothesis 1 says that centralized state institutions make credit markets centralized. Table 2 shows that the relation holds provided that one controls for one additional variableÑstate banking. There is a very good reason for doing so. Historically, state centralization has had two contradictory effects on market centralization depending on the period considered. Until World War I, state centralization mostly worked against all forms of local banking (commercial and nonprofit), strengthening profit banking. In contrast, following the two wars many centralized states (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, New Zealand) established strong state banking sectors, with the effect of segmenting the credit market and, thus, weakening profit banks. 54 State banking peaked in the 1960s (reaching an average of 20 percent) and has been gently receding since (dropping to about 10 percent on average in the 1990s), thereby restoring the past conjunction between centralized state and strong profit banking.
There is no point justifying the exclusion of outliers in regressions 2, 4 and 6, given that all specifications, with or without outliers, show significant results. I wish only to clarify the odd behavior of the Canadian caseÑa strong outlier in 1960, a mild one in 1970 and 1980, and one no longer in 1990. Once again, the explanation is historical. The Canadian financial system was established under British rule in the first half of the 19 th century, reflecting LondonÕs preference for centralization. Although quite centralized under British occupation as well, the Canadian state over time became a prototype of federal decentralization, a trend that brought along an equivalent decentralization of the credit market, but with a rather long lagÑonly since 1945, and in a very incremental way, has the Canadian credit market been exhibiting a trend toward segmentation (see Graph 1). There still was a discrepancy between state and credit market structure in 1960; there isnÕt one any more in 1990.
[ Table 2 ] Hypotheses 2 and 3 are tested in Table 3 and 4, the only difference between the two tables being the specification of the dependent variableÑFDI in Table 3 , bonds in Table 4 . I begin with FDI. Hypothesis 2 (financial globalization is correlated with credit market centralization) is tested in regressions 8 to 13. The test is successively administered in the sixties, seventies, and eighties; globalization being a recent phenomenon, the coefficient for the credit market variable should gain in significance over time. This expectation is borne out by the findings. Export dependence alone performs well in the sixties (regression 9). The other control variableÑAnglo-SaxonÑbecomes significant in the seventies (regressions 10 and 11), when globalization takes off. Although one would expect the Anglo-Saxon dummy to lose some importance in the eighties, when the financial variable assumes 53 The partial regression plot is, according to Bollen and Jackman (1990: 260) Òthe multivariate analog of the bivariate scattergram.Ó Each plot generates a coefficient and a fit that are equal to the coefficient and fit of the dependent variable against the chosen right-hand-side variable, while simultaneously controlling for the effect of the other right-hand-side variables on the dependent variable. 54 See Verdier 1997. more importance, its dismal performance is inexplicable (regressions 12 and 13).
[ Table 3 ] Let us now consider the potential outliers listed at the bottom of Table 3 . The cases of Australia (regression 8) and Ireland (regression 12) merely reflect shocks in FDI inflows (excessively high in the case of Australia, excessively low in that of Ireland) specific to each country. The impact of the Irish outlying value is such that it makes Belgium appear to be a mild outlier, when in fact it isnÕt, and stops being one once Ireland is taken out of the regression (results unreported). In the case of Canada (regression 10), we find the same problem as in regression 3 already discussedÑthe centralization of the Canadian credit market is well beyond that of state institutions, confounding expectations. I have no good explanation for treating the last two potential mild outliersÑthe U.S. in regression 8 and New Zealand in regression 10Ñas actual outliers. Hypothesis 2 receives strong confirmation, nevertheless: centralization of the credit market is, over time, found to be increasingly correlated with greater FDI inflows.
Looking now at regressions 14-19, the findings are equally compelling with respect to hypothesis 3Ñfinancial globalization (here again proxied by FDI inflows) reflects state centralization. High FDI inflows is solely explained by export dependence in the sixties. Then, as globalization takes off in the seventies, the other two variables (Anglo-Saxon and state centralization) become relevant, and so remain in the eighties. Ireland is a strong outlier in regression 18 and Australia in regression 14 due to an exogenous shock in the dependent variable. Such is also the case for Norway in regression 16. Canada presents the (by now) expected erratic behavior (regressions 14 and 16). Although there is no good reason to exclude the mild potential outliers in regression 14 and 16, in either case exclusion has no impact on the findings. The case of regression 18 is more nuanced, as shown in the partial regression plots (reported in Graph 3). Belgium is no real outlier, but Switzerland is. Switzerland appears to be a problematic case for the present theory: whereas FDI inflows are in keeping with the growing centralization of the Swiss credit market (evidenced in Graph 1 and regression 12), this centralization is happening in the absence of no corresponding change in state structure (regression 5), thereby causing the discrepancy between a decentralized state structure and a high financial dependence registered in regression 18 and shown in Graph 3.
[Graph 3 ] Overall, the findings fail to falsify hypothesis 2 and 3. Centralized institutions and the Ango-Saxon market-oriented tradition favor financial globalization. More generally, product globalization and financial trade globalization are no surrogate. Although, the Export/GDP variable is correlated with the FDI/GDP variable in most regressions, the two variables do not overlap. They are not interchangeable proxies for globalization, but two dimensions of globalization between which state institutions, after controlling for Anglo-Saxon background, seem to drive a wedge.
The present results call for futher testing. Two additional tests are performed. First and as announced, I substitute bonds for FDI as dependent variable.
Consider Table 4 , in which bonds are used to proxy financial globalization for the most recent period. 55 Hypothesis 2 and 3 are tested in regressions 20 and 21 respectively. Although the findings conform to expectations, they are plagued with potential outliers. In light of the very low N, the partial regression plots are more appropriate than a re-run of the regressions without the problematic observations. Examination of the partial plot for the credit market variable in regression 20 (Graph 4) and for the state variable in regression 21 (Graph 5) reveals no anomaly; surely in both cases the U.K. observation is pulling the regression line through itself, but the other countries are not so much out of line, so to speak, that the results should be dismissed as spurious. This last test shows that hypotheses 2 and 3 are equally observable when financial globalization is proxied with securities or with FDI.
[ Table 4 , Graph 4 and 5 ] Cross-sectional time-series model. The last and final test allows us to transcend the potential outlier problem plaguing the low-N cross-sectional method by pooling 15 countries over 25 years (N = 375). Only hypothesis 3 can bear the test, due to missing values in the intermediate variable.
56 Preliminary tests (unreported here) indicated that the residuals are normally distributed (and the model, thus, correctly specificed), but successively detected the three banes of groupwise heteroscedasticity, contemporaneous heteroscedasticity, and serial correlation. 57 The fact that the number of time periods (25) is greater than the number of panels (15) justifies the use of feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), correcting for the problems mentioned, serial correlation notably, through the use of an autoregressive (AR1) coefficient parameter for the error term common to all panels. Two variations of this model are run, one with Beck and KatzÕs (1995) panel corrected standard errors, the other without, on the grounds that the number of time periods is such that either method could a priori be justified. To the variables already used in regressions 14-19 and 21, I added a trend variable varying exponentiallyÑ(t-1969) 2 , with t the year of the observationÑto capture the overall growth in financial interdependence. Results are reported in Table 5 .
[ Table 5 ] The findings in both specifications confirm the statistical significance of all four variables. The coefficients are consistent and correctly signed across specifications. Although statistical significance is consistently lower with panelcorrected standard errors, it still reaches standard levels. Once again, product globalization is correlated with financial globalization but it leaves an unexplained residualÑcases in which export-orientation and financial dependence stand at relatively opposite corners of the value range. After controlling for the Anglo-Saxon tradition, this unexplained residual is consistently found to be correlated with state centralization.
In sum, available evidence is compatible with the claim advanced in this paperÑthat countries with decentralized state institutions are less internationalized than countries with centralized ones. There is also equally strong support for the claim that this overall impact in part is mediated by financial institutions. Political centralization is associated with credit market centralization, and credit market centralization with financial globalization.
Conclusion
The deregulation of financial markets has caused financial systems to become more market-mediated and international than they used to be twenty years ago. Bank intermediation is being displaced by market transactions and financiers are supplementing domestic with international business. This strengthening of the global financial market has distributional consequences: it favors central governments, center banks, large firms, and large metropolitan areas while harming local governments, local banks, small and medium-size firms, and industrial districts located at the periphery. This trend is not uniform; it is most advanced in centralized and Anglo-Saxon countries, and least so in decentralized and non AngloSaxon countries.
In many ways, the present is a repetition of the past. A similar process of financial internationalization occurred under the classic Gold Standard. In the 19 th century as well, a surge in competition in financial markets led banks to standardize their offerings, and concentrate and internationalize their undertakings. In the 19th century as well, the growth of the world market drew financial centers closer to one another, while taking each financial center farther away from its own periphery. In the 19th century as well, this trend was most salient in centralized countries, where peripheries enjoy little political and economic power, and least so in decentralized ones, where local governments have more policy instruments at their disposal to thwart the drain on local financial resources.
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Perhaps the most striking similarity between the two periods is the importance of space, economically and politically. Surely location was not as important of an input in the process of production during the Fordist era, marked by internal scale economies, as in the days of post-Fordism, marked by external scale economies. But distributional conflicts in the field of finance were still cleft along the center-periphery cleavage in the late-19th century, with the financial center embracing financial globalism and the agrarian periphery wishing to curb the mobility of savings. And a similar conflict is currently emerging between local governments, with those benefiting from the current agglomeration effects endorsing globalism, and those losing from these effects, clinging to national solidarity.
The territorial cleavage has portentous effectsÑit undermines national unity. Its effect was not strongly felt under the Gold Standard because it was offset by the trend toward national protection. Unlike today, protection was ubiquitous. Protectionism is what allowed the political elites in countries like France, the United States, and many others (Britain excepted) to surround themselves with, and rely on 58 See Verdier 1998. the support of, national trade associations, bodies that organized and represented all firms in a nation belonging to the same sector. In decentralized countries, such as Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland, tariffs allowed the political elites to form Òiron-and-ryeÓ coalitions, which allowed them to bridge the widening chasm between urban center and agrarian periphery and steer their country clear of the ethnic, separatist, and nationalist conflicts of the time.
World War I further cemented national unity by putting an end to financial globalization and by empowering the working class, thereby bringing the class cleavage to the fore. Although this period saw the substitution of volatility in one input market (labor) for another (capital), it allowed political elites to nationalize politics in all countries, even the most decentralized ones. The class cleavage captured the political stage in the days of prohibitive tariffs. The class cleavage also allowed some countries to pursue tariff disarmament during the postwar era (especially during the climatic 1970s) thanks to corporatist bargains struck between the respective peak associations of labor and capital to the effect of stabilizing industrial relations.
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In contrast, today's reality is one of free trade and free finance. For the first time in modern history, firms are facing volatility in both their input and output markets. They adjust to this greater uncertainty by increasing product flexibility through innovation, relocation, and diversificationÑa costly strategy that only the largest and most profitable among them can afford in today's globalized financial markets. Their nonmarket options have changed, indeed narrowed down to interterritorial competitionÑa competition in which only the most active local governments have a chance of reversing adverse forces. Trade associations and political parties, in contrast, are losing their raison dÕ•tre. Free trade, along with the quasi-judicialization of its violations within EU, NAFTA, and WTO panels is making obsolete the sectoral cleavage, the cleavage that is typical of politics in product markets. Free trade is disqualifying the practice of lobbying for sectoral rents, the nonmarket option typically pursued by sectoral organizations. Simultaneously, the collapse of working-class militancy has emptied the class cleavage, the cleavage that is typical of labor markets; it has voided class organization and corporatism, the nonmarket options afforded by class politics. Right and Left only differ on the issue of indemnification, a policy that assumes globalization victorious. The territorial cleavage, the cleavage that is more typical of financial markets on account of the territorial mobility of capital, is thus winning by default. The territorial organization of the nation state is at issue, and the threat of disintegration in countries like Germany and Italy is probably greatest since unification. Centralization, 1960 Centralization, , 1970 Centralization, , 1980 Centralization, , 1990 , 1961-1970, 1971-1980, 1981-1990 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: FDI Inflows Weighted by GDP 1961 GDP -1970 GDP 1971 GDP -1980 GDP 1981 GDP -1990 GDP 1961 GDP -1970 GDP 1971 GDP -1980 GDP 1981 GDP -1990 Data Description and Sources: The dependent variable is the cumulative inflows of direct investment weighted by GDP over the indicated period (OECD 1989, p. 60, and 1996, p. 80) . ÒExport/GDPÓ is the ratio of total exports to GDP averaged over the indicated period (OECD National Accounts). Anglo-Saxon is a dummy variable. For ÒRevenue Share of the Central Government,Ó see GDP (1970 -1981 : OECD 1987 1982 -1983 : OECD International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, 1994 : OECD International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, 1996 . Export/GDP is the ratio of total exports to GDP (OECD National Accounts). Anglo-Saxon is a dummy variable. For Revenue Share of the Government, see Graph 3: Partial Regression Plots, All Variables, Regression 18, Table 3 
